Todays opening of the second part of the Microsoft antitrust case
at the European Court in Luxembourg made a furious start with several
hours of Microsoft presentation. Mr Forrester opened with the
heartbreaking example of an Irish TV guide called McGill, which was
the first to list the program of an entire week across several
channels, and which was crushed by the monopolistic tv channels. To me
it sounded a little bit like Microsoft crushing Netscape after
discovering that their proprietary internet approach did not work.
Microsoft then brought in John Shewchuck, who went into a very long
Powerpoint presentation about how Directory Servers were only 2% of
the servers typically used in companies, and thus not so important. He
also went into a long and vague description of the general functioning
principle of clients and servers, which had little to do with the
actual substance of the case, but made it seem like Samba was the
functional equal to a Microsoft Server.
He also explained that "It is hard to sell products unless you
can ensure interoperability" -- go figure. Indeed that is
precisely what Microsoft competitors criticise: Microsoft likes to
adhere to interoperability as long as it feels it can take over market
share from competitors, to then modify the protocols to lock that
market away from competition. This is essentially the substance of the
entire case.
Mr Shewchuck also explained that the reason for the Microsoft Magic
was that one server knew what kind of response and behaviour from
another. This is what creates the "Service Boundary" that is defining
where the "Tightly Coupled Protocols." Only with some self-restraint
is one able to curb cynicism and avoid the statement that we should be
glad Microsoft did not declare the entire internet its service
boundary: After all, knowing what kind of input brings which kind of
response, and how servers should respond to certain inputs, is the
basic principle of any protocol.
Microsoft has no idea what their software does
When Mr Forrester took back over, statements became outright
hilarious. He explained that after the decision, Microsoft had worked
extremely hard to fulfill the terms: According to him, Microsoft had
210 developers working on studying over 10 million lines of code. They
also "chased down" retired engineers to find out what they had done
and why. In short: Microsoft has no clue of the code and design
decisions in its systems. They cannot tell people about protocols,
because they don't have that information themselves.
Overall, Mr Forrester claims that more than 35 thousand working
hours were spent to create 12560 pages of documentation, expanding
continuously. From a software engineering point of view, this is worse
than anyone would ever have dared to joke about.
We will sue you
As Mr Forrester went on to explain, this documentation was then put
into a kind of digital encyclopedia, which is sorted by a method that
Microsoft holds a software patent on in both the European Union and
the United States (from memory: us patent no 5,968,211). Without a
software patent license, the documentation of their protocols cannot
be used -- because Microsoft will sue anyone who dares to do so
without license.
Software patents indeed played a central role in the closing
remarks. Apparently it is Microsofts proof of innovation in this field
to hold 4 granted and 3 applications for software patents in the EU,
as well as 27 granted and 12 filed elsewhere. He also made another
thing plainly clear: "I doubt that each of these could be engineered
around!"
Translation: You may be able to force us to document what we do,
but we will make sure you cannot read it without being potentially
liable to software patent infringement. And even if you figure out how
it works, we may try sueing you for software patent infringement in
case you dare to interoperate with us without our permission.
Migration to Microsoft, anyone?
The intervening parties concluded with Centrify, a March 2004
United States startup that apparently wrote "Anti-Samba": Its main
functionality appears to be integrating other clients into Windows,
providing a migration path into Windows. Indeed, they demonstrated
live how to integrate a Red Hat client into a Microsoft Active
Directory Server Domain -- and of course Red Hat was running text
console only, to imply that only Windows is nice and
user-friendly.
Lunch, at last
Finally we heard about how the European Commission ruling was in
conflict with the TRIPS treaty, as it was an alledged case of
compulsory licensing. This once more demonstrates the connection of
"intellectual property" as antithesis to competition and the spread of
these monopolies being a direct reaction to antitrust laws, as
explained in "Information Feudalism" by Peter Drahos and
Braithwaite. I recommend reading it.